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GUN CONTROL AND
THE CRIMINAL-LAW POWER
Peter W. Hogg



I. INTRODUCTION
The federal power over criminal law has no counterpart in the United States or
Australia, where criminal law is a state responsibility. This power has enabled the
Parliament of Canada to enact a national Criminal Code1 as well as some other
statutes that criminalize dangerous or deceptive behaviour. Early attempts to use
the power as a tool to regulate the insurance industry2 or prices generally3 were
rebuffed by the Privy Council, although their Lordships did use the power to
uphold a primitive form of federal competition law in which the sole mode of
enforcement was the criminal prosecution.4
Those who dream of an increased regulatory presence for the Parliament of
Canada have not in the past usually nominated the criminal-law power as a likely
source of that presence — outside the conventional domain of criminal law. The
difficulty was that the cases established that a valid criminal law had to take the
form of a prohibition coupled with a penalty in support of a “typically criminal”
purpose.5 These three requirements severely limited the topics upon which criminal
law could be enacted, and the legislative techniques that could be employed. In the
last six years, however, three decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have
upheld rather bold uses of the criminal-law power in such diverse areas as tobacco
advertising, environmental protection and gun control.
_______________________________________________________________
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1
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
2
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Reciprocal Insurers, [1924] A.C. 328 (P.C.).
3
Reference re Board of Commerce Act, 1919 (Canada), [1922] 1 A.C. 1910 (P.C.).
4
Proprietary Articles Trade Assn. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1931] A.C. 310 (P.C.).
5
Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1951] A.C.
179 (P.C.).
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II. TOBACCO
The first decision is RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General),6 in
which the Supreme Court of Canada had to review the validity of the federal
Tobacco Products Control Act,7 which prohibited the advertising of cigarettes and
other tobacco products. It was clear that the criminal-law power permitted
Parliament to prohibit the manufacture, sale or possession of dangerous products.
But Parliament had not done that: the manufacture, sale and possession of tobacco
remained lawful and all that was prohibited was the advertising of tobacco
products. Advertising itself was not a dangerous act, and the advertising of
consumer goods was normally within the jurisdiction of the provinces under their
power over property and civil rights.8 In the Supreme Court of Canada, Major J.’s
dissenting view was that the prohibition of the advertising of a legal product lacked
a typically criminal purpose and was outside the criminal-law power. La Forest J.
for the majority disagreed. In his view, the power to prohibit the use of tobacco on
account of its harmful effects on health also encompassed the power to take the
lesser step of prohibiting the advertising of tobacco products. Although it was
impracticable to ban the product itself in view of the large number of Canadians
who were smokers, the ban on advertising still pursued the same underlying public
purpose of protecting the public from a dangerous product. The majority of the
Court therefore held that the Act was within the criminal-law power of Parliament.
(The Act was actually struck down by a majority of the Court under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,9 because of the impact of the advertising ban on
freedom of expression.)

III. ENVIRONMENT
The second of the three cases is R. v. Hydro-Québec,10 in which the Supreme
Court of Canada upheld the Canadian Environmental Protection Act,11 which is a
federal law that establishes a scheme for the regulation of toxic substances. The
Ministers of Environment and Health have authority to examine the effects of any
substance and to recommend to the Governor in Council that the substance be
classified as “toxic,” which involves a finding that the substance is harmful to the
_______________________________________________________________
6

[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199. On the criminal-law power, La Forest J. wrote the majority opinion with the
support of six other members of the Court; Major J. dissented on this issue with the support of Sopinka J.
7
R.S.C. 1985, c. 14 (4th Supp.) [rep. S.C. 1997, c. 13, s. 64].
8
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
9
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
10
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 213. The majority opinion was written by La Forest J. with the agreement of
L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Cory and McLachlin JJ. The dissenting opinion was written by Lamer C.J.C.
and Iacobucci J. with the agreement of Sopinka and Major JJ.
11
R.S.C. 1985, c. 16 (4th Supp.) [repealed and replaced by S.C. 1999, c. 33].
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environment or a danger to human health. Once classified as toxic, the substance
comes under the regulatory authority of the Governor in Council, which may make
regulations governing its release into the environment, and the manner and
conditions under which it can be manufactured, imported, processed, transported,
stored, sold, used and discarded. Hydro-Québec was prosecuted for violating an
“interim order” authorized by the Act. The corporation argued that the Act, and
therefore the interim order, was outside the criminal-law power of the federal
Parliament.
The corporation’s argument was accepted by Lamer C.J.C. and Iacobucci J.,
who wrote for the four dissenting judges. In their view, although the protection of
the environment was a legitimate purpose for a criminal law, this Act lacked the
prohibitory character of a criminal law. There was no prohibition until the
administrative process to classify the substance (or to make an interim order) had
been completed, and “[i]t would be an odd crime whose definition was made
entirely dependent on the discretion of the Executive.”12 The dissenters were also
troubled by a provision of the Act that exempted a province from a regulation if
that province already had an equivalent law in place; that, said Lamer C.J.C. and
Iacobucci J., “would be a very unusual provision for a criminal law.” 13 But La
Forest J., writing for the majority, upheld the Act as a criminal law. In his view,
because the administrative procedure for assessing the toxicity of substances
culminated in a prohibition enforced by a penal sanction, the scheme was
sufficiently prohibitory. He characterized the exemption for provinces with
equivalent provincial laws as recognizing the reality that much of the field of
environmental protection is effectively concurrent. In the end, then, the Act was
upheld as a criminal law.

IV. GUN CONTROL
The third of the three cases is Reference re Firearms Act (Canada),14 in which a
challenge was mounted to Canada’s gun control legislation, which is part of the
Criminal Code. The main techniques of control consist of requirements to register
all firearms and to license all firearms owners. The Supreme Court of Canada held
that the purpose of gun control was public safety, which was a typically criminal
purpose. The purpose was ultimately effected by a prohibition of unregistered guns
and unlicensed holders, and the prohibition was backed by penalties. The
opponents of gun control argued that the Act was regulatory rather than criminal
legislation, because of the complexity of the regime and the discretionary powers
_______________________________________________________________
12
13
14

R. v. Hydro-Québec, supra, note 10, at para. 55.
Id., at para. 57.
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 783. The unanimous opinion was the opinion of “the Court.”
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vested in the licensing and registration authorities. Only an outright prohibition of
guns, it was argued, would be a valid criminal law. The Court relied on its prior
decision in Hydro-Québec for the proposition that the criminal-law power
authorizes complex legislation, including discretionary administrative authority.
And the Court relied on its prior decision in RJR-MacDonald for the proposition
that a criminal purpose may be pursued by indirect means. Just as the health risks
of tobacco did not require the outright banning of cigarettes, the safety risks of
guns did not require the outright banning of guns. Measures that would indirectly
advance the legislative purpose, such as the advertising ban in RJR-MacDonald or
the licensing and registration requirements of the gun control legislation, were
authorized by the criminal-law power.

V. CONCLUSION
These three decisions take the criminal-law power well beyond the conventional
limits of criminal law. The first case (RJR-MacDonald) shows that even a harmless
activity (advertising in that case) can be regulated, provided it is in the ultimate
service of preventing a harmful activity. The second case (Hydro-Québec) shows
that harm to the environment, not necessarily harm to persons or property, can
serve
as a sufficient purpose to justify criminal law, and leaves the door open to other
kinds of harms as well. The second and third cases (HydroQuébec and Firearms) show that regimes of regulation with elaborate regulatory
structures and official decision-making can be upheld as criminal law, although
they are a far cry from the model of a law that is self-applied by the individuals to
whom it applies and is enforced only by police, prosecutors and the criminal
courts. The conclusion is that much more can be done with the criminal-law power
than we imagined 50 years ago, or even 10 years ago.
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